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Abstract: This study not only revisits, from a meta-analytic perspective, the influence of firms’
boardroom independence on corporate financial performance, but also addresses the way that
countries’ social and institutional contexts moderate that connection. A meta-regression covering
126 independent samples reveals that firms’ boardroom independence has a positive and negative
effect on accounting and market-based measures of corporate financial performance, respectively.
Further analyses reveal that while the firms’ board independence-financial performance connection is
stronger in non-communitarian societies, that relationship becomes weaker in countries with greater
developed mechanisms to protect the interest of minority investors. These results are robust to
different model specifications and to the presence of a set of methodological control variables. Our
results are of outstanding relevance for companies’ board composition processes by suggesting the
way that corporations should actively re-balance the proportion of independent directors across
different social and institutional contexts to ensure their financial success.
Keywords: corporate governance; boards’ independence; corporate financial performance;
meta-analysis; meta-regression
1. Introduction
A large body of academic research [1–3] addresses the financial outcomes of different corporate
board structures. Among them, some academics (see for example [4,5]), hypothesize on the relationship
between enhanced firms’ boardroom independence and corporate financial performance (CFP).
While some studies find a positive connection [6–9], others argue for a negative influence of board
independence on CFP [10–12].
This situation reflects the existing narrative of reviews on board composition and performance,
which describe the relationship as mixed, inconsistent, and vexing. Under this controversy, some
authors tried to shed some light on that relationship through the development of meta-analytic studies.
The first paper was that written by Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson [13], and revealed a little influence
of firms’ board independence on CFP. Two years later, Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy [14]
revisited the above-mentioned relationship and addressed that firms’ boardroom composition only
explained less than one percent of the variation in CFP. Furthermore, they stated that one-third
of the findings’ variations across firms’ boardroom composition studies was a consequence of the
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sampling error, thus their results did not reflect the “true differences in the relationship between board
composition measures and financial performance” [14], p. 86. It is nearly twenty years since that
preliminary evidence. Accordingly, these studies are not able to encompass the significant changes in
companies’ boards that appear because of changes in the legal requirements in recent years. (In 2006,
the UK Combined Code required that half of the board members should be non-executive independent
directors. In 2010, the UK Corporate Governance Code recommended that firms’ boards should have
the appropriate balance of skills, experience, independence, and knowledge. The EU Commission’s
recommendation 2005/162/EC stated that firms’ boardrooms should show an appropriate balance
of executive and managing, and non- executive and supervisory directors, with the objective of
avoiding small groups of individuals who could dominate corporate decision-making processes. EU
2014/56 Directive argued for a majority of independent directors for audit committees of public-interest
companies. Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) recommended in 2010 the inclusion
of independent directors into Asian firms’ boards. The Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC) issued in 2001 a guideline requiring listed companies to have at least one-third independent
directors. Further initiatives have also been developed in the US, Australia, Brazil, Canada and France).
In an attempt to update the earlier meta-analyses, Van Essen, Van Oosterhout, & Carney [15] and
Mutlu, Van Essen, Peng, Saleh & Duran [16] examined the effect of corporations’ board independence
on CFP. Van Essen et al. [15] focused on Asian firms and addressed a small positive effect of firms’
board independence on CFP. Similarly, Mutlu et al. [16] exclusively focused on Chinese companies and
reported that firms’ boardroom independence and CFP were positively associated with CFP.
Although the last meta-analyses on the topic (i.e., [15,16]) can be useful when understanding the
connections between some major good corporate governance principles and CFP in Asian companies,
two main challenge arises. The first one is related with how the obtained recent knowledge on
the firms’ board independence–CFP relationship can be extended to other institutional and social
contexts such as Europe or the U.S. The second one, such as revealed by Dalton et al. [13] and
Rhoades et al. [14], deals with the fact that further research is required to assess whether some
conceptual and methodological moderators enhance or restrict the possible influence of firms’
boardroom independence on CFP. In an attempt to bring some order to this understanding, this
paper not only asks the question: “What is the effect of the independence of a firm’s board on corporate
financial performance?”, but also; “which factors moderate the relationship between firms’ boardroom
independence and organizational performance?” To ask these questions, a meta-analytic regression
analysis (MARA) [17,18] is implemented. This technique allows the analysis of the interaction between
an internal governance variable (e.g., board independence) and different external variables from
the perspective of the “bundle of governance mechanism” [19]. Under this approach, the optimal
governance structure should consider a combination of different mechanisms above the effectiveness
of a particular governance standard or practice [20,21]. Accordingly, the MARA technique permits
us to assess whether a combination of governance mechanisms with other external variables has an
influence on CFP.
In fact, we respond to a recent claim made by some academics [21,22], about the need to clarify the
role played by international institutional and social contexts in the firms’ boardroom independence–CFP
connection. In this way, this paper assesses the way that some conceptual and methodological variables
moderate the relationship between firms’ boardroom independence and CFP, those being: (i) CFP
measurement approaches (market-based CFP proxies versus accounting-based measures); (ii) market
conditions (economic growth versus recession periods); (iii) countries’ legal systems (common law
versus civil law countries); and (iv) minority investors protection mechanisms. For robustness reasons,
we control for journal quality based on the assumption that this is a reflection of analytical and
methodological rigor. Accordingly, this paper will allow us to understand how the firms’ independent
directors’ efficiency has evolved and interacts with companies’ CFP since the pioneer works of
Dalton et al. [13] and Rhodes et al. [14]. Moreover, this paper contributes to existing literature by
addressing how the existence and enforcement of minority investors’ protection mechanisms can
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modify the influence of firms’ boardroom independence on CFP. Another contribution of the paper is
related with the fact that it is able to assess whether different institutional constraints (e.g., countries’
legal systems) moderate the connection between companies’ board independence and CFP. In this
way, this paper complements past research [15,16] by addressing whether different levels in firms’
independent directs’ efficiency has an influence on companies’ financial success. Past research reveals a
wide range of CFP measures [23], which are mainly classified into: (i) Accounting-based CFP measures;
and (ii) market-based proxies. Because of the different nature of the CFP measures, this paper also
contributes to the existing knowledge by capturing the influence of firms’ boardroom independence
on the two perspectives of CFP (i.e., accounting vs market-based CFP). Finally, it complements
Ortas et al. [24], showing that a more independent board of directors plays a major role in promoting
the Corporate Sustainability Performance [25] and triple bottom line performance [26], addressing
firms contributions to environmental preservation, social welfare, and economic progress [27].
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical
arguments, which lead to the hypotheses’ formulation and moderating effects in Section 3. The two
subsequent sections describe the method and the meta-analytic results. The results are discussed in
detail in Section 6. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Theoretical Foundations
Theories linking firms’ boardroom independence and CFP draw upon studies in agency and
resource dependence theory. This section describes how previous research supports a connection
between board independence and CFP. Agency theory and resource dependence theory are discussed
because they are the most promising explanations of the influence of board independence on CFP.
References are made to other theories when relevant.
Previous research [21,28] refers to the independence of corporate boards as a governance
mechanism whose effectiveness is determined by the incentives of managers and the ability of board
members to monitor the company’s management [29–31]. There is a long tradition of independent
directors in Anglo-Saxon economies [32–34], which are characterized by high levels of shareholder
dispersion [35]. Companies are not controlled and managed by large shareholders, and the control
function rests with independent directors [1,2,36]. This control and value-protection mechanism
has traditionally been understood in terms of agency theory [37,38]. In the corporate governance
context “agency theory implies that adequate monitoring mechanisms need to be established to
protect shareholders from management’s self-interests” ([7], p. 494). In this context, independent
directors mitigate conflicts between shareholders and top management [39–41]. From the agency
theory perspective, “independent directors are expected to be more likely to represent shareholder
interests and potentially take a stand against the CEO” ([9], p. 450). Independent directors draw on
their prior experience to improve the capacity of the board to monitor managers’ decisions [37], leading
to increased CFP [37,38,42–44]. For example, Rosenstein and Wyatt [45] found that the announcement
of the appointment of independent directors in the US market generates an increase in the stock value
and shareholder wealth. Other studies [1,46] found that companies with more independent directors
are less likely to experience financial distress and are less likely to file for bankruptcy. Overall, from
the agency theory perspective, board independence should improve CFP.
Board independence has become a key element of corporate governance and the functions of
independent directors were extended from a simple control function to more complicated expectations,
such as the need to create corporate value [29,39] and manage the interests and demands of a variety
of stakeholders [47,48]. The value creation function of independent directors has been analyzed
theoretically using the resource dependence theory [48]. In this approach, “the need for resources,
including financial and physical resources as well as information, obtained from the environment,
[makes] organisations potentially dependent on the external sources of these resources” [47], p. 12.
Pfeffer [48] argues that this dependency can represent an increase in risk, and that companies should
establish and maintain a close relationship with the owners of resources. Resource dependence theory
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addresses some benefits of increasing the degree of independence of company boards: (i) It increases
the range of perspectives, advice, and counsel [49]; (ii) it could add legitimacy to the organization [50];
and (iii) it improves communication, commitment, and access to specific resources [51]. According
to resource dependence theory, companies should evaluate the capacity of independent directors to
provide critical resources and to assess their impact on CFP [52].
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
3.1. Linking Board Independence and Corporate Financial Performance
Previous research comprises several meta-analyses aimed to capture the effect of different corporate
governance mechanisms on CFP and even on other dimensions of organizational performance (e.g.,
corporate social performance). Such meta-analyses mainly focus on a single mechanism or dimension
because of two reasons. Firstly, with the objective of avoiding finding a non-significant result because of
a possible compensation effect derived from the different impact of the governance mechanisms on CFP.
Secondly, the combination of different governance mechanism in a meta-analysis involves reducing
the sample of articles, thus the sampling error appears as the main driver of the possible significant
results [14]. However, and considering the growing number of papers dealing with these issues due to
their interest in the international agenda (both at the institutional and managerial scopes), it will be
possible in the near future to ascertain whether a combination of different governance mechanisms
enhance or restrict CFP. For those reasons, there are many papers linking only one dimension of
corporate governance practices and CFP. For example, Post & Byron [53] and Ionascu et al. [54] focused
on one dimension of good governance practices (i.e., board gender composition) on CFP. Based on
firms’ board independence, Rhoades et al. [14] analyzed its influence on CFP. Dalton, Daily, Johnson, &
Ellstrand [55] also carried out a meta-analysis addressing the influence of companies’ board size on CFP.
Similarly, Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy [56] assessed, from a meta-analytic perspective, the
relationship between a company’s board leadership structure and CFP. Extant research also comprises
studies assessing the influence of firms’ ownership structures (concentration and dispersion) on
CFP [57,58]. Due to the previous reasoning, we decided to focus on only one of the most addressed
corporate governance mechanisms in previous research (i.e., firms’ boardroom independence). In
fact, the present paper not only addresses the influence of corporations’ board efficiency on CFP
but also assesses how different institutional and social contexts can moderate the above-mentioned
relationship. To that aim, previous research on the topic is reviewed and synthesized (see Table A1 for
further details).
Extant research comprises a wide range of studies aiming to test a possible relationship between
firms’ boardroom independence and CFP in different regions: (i) Lefort & Urzua [5] in the Chilean
context; (ii) Jackling & Johl [7] focused on a sample of Indian firms; (iii) Honeine & Swan [59] in the
Australian context; and iv) Ameer, Ramli, & Zakaria [60] focused on a sample of Malaysian firms.
However, the results of extant literature on the topic is vexing and inconclusive. For example, the
above-mentioned papers only found a positive and significant influence of firms’ board independence
on CFP when this latter construct is measured by market-based proxies. Other research [8,61–63]
addressed a positive relationship between firms’ boardroom independence and CFP when it was
measured through accounting-based proxies.
Existing research also contains studies that address a negative influence of boards’ independence
on CFP. For example, Adams & Ferreira [64], who focused on a sample of US firms, concluded that
companies which exhibited enhanced levels of their directors’ independence achieved lower CFP.
Similarly, Kaczmarek, Kimino & Pye [65] addressed that relationship in the UK context and revealed a
negative influence of firms’ board independence on CFP. Moreover, Darmadi [66], who focused on a
sample of Indonesian companies, addressed a decrease in CFP for those firms with greater levels of
board independence. Finally, Terjesen, Couto & Francisco [9] implemented a multi-country approach
using data from 3876 public firms in 47 countries and were not able to capture significant dependence
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patterns between firms’ boardroom independence and CFP. Based on the previous discussion, and
according with agency and resource dependence theories, the following hypothesis is proposed to
be tested:
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Companies exhibiting greater levels of board independence will achieve higher levels of
corporate financial performance.
3.2. Conceptual Moderators
The present meta-analysis is able not only to assess the possible influence of firms’ boardroom
independence on CFP, but also addresses the way that some conceptual moderators have a role in that
relationship. In this section, we develop the arguments aimed to test the possible moderating role of
several variables that capture some issues related with countries’ institutional and social environments.
3.2.1. Effect of Countries’ Legal Systems: Communitarian vs. Shareholder Perspective
Existing research [67–69] has shown that corporate governance models vary significantly across
countries with different institutional and social settings.
Haake [70] classified countries as communitarian or individualistic. Communitarian countries
(i.e., codified law countries), are found in many continental European countries, defined as “systems
in which actors share tight interfaces that turn theses parties into interconnected communities” [70]
(p. 720). Furthermore, those societies are typified by close and stable relationships between actors,
and this situation generates key responsibilities not only towards their controlling shareholders [71].
Individualistic countries, on the other hand, (i.e., those exhibiting a common-law legal system) are
mainly found in the US and other Anglo-Saxon countries [71]. Haake [70] (p. 720) defines individualistic
business systems as systems “in which actors safeguard their individual autonomy through loose
interfaces”.
Ball, Kothari, & Robin [72] found that shareholder dispersion is greater in common law countries, so
that companies face significant agency conflicts between managers and shareholders [58]. Traditionally,
companies in common law countries have protected shareholders’ needs and interests. This is why
these countries have been described as having a shareholder orientation. Accordingly, independent
directors on companies’ boards in common law countries often represent the “voice of the dominant”
shareholders and mainly develop control and advice functions.
In contrast with this, shareholder concentration is more likely in communitarian countries [35,70,73].
In these countries, the major agency problems appear between large shareholders and the minority
shareholders [58]. Some authors [74,75] have found that communitarian countries pass laws to protect
the rights of a wide range of stakeholders, such as workers. This has been described as a stakeholder
orientation. In these countries, firms’ independent directors are expected to consider not only the
shareholders’ claims, but also the sensitivities and motivations of key stakeholders. According with
this reasoning, the following hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The relationship between firms’ boardroom independence and corporate financial
performance is weaker for companies in common law countries.
3.2.2. The Role of Mechanisms to Protect Minority Investors
Previous research [68,76] indicates that the adoption of legal mechanisms to protect the interests
of minority investors are not homogeneous across countries. Bonn, Yoshikawa, & Phan. [77] argue
that the financial efficiency of independent directors can vary because different shareholder protection
mechanisms are in place. In this way, Ferrarini & Fillippelli [32] found that independent directors of
companies in countries with effective investor protection measures may be more likely to use their
human and social capital when controlling or providing resources [21], because irresponsible behavior
could lead to loss of reputation and judicial liability. In contrast with this, independent directors of
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companies in countries with weak shareholder protection are less likely to meet their obligations, thus
lowering their efficiency, [78,79]. Accordingly, the following hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 3 (H3). The relationship between firms’ boardroom independence and corporate financial
performance is stronger in countries with strong minority shareholders’ protection mechanisms.
4. Method Features
4.1. Sample Selection
More than 2500 articles were identified in existing research using a variety of search techniques (see
Field and Gillett, [80] for further details). Some combinations of “board independence, independent
directors, board composition, outside directors, corporate financial performance, organizational
performance, return on assets, return on sales, growth, return on equity, market return, Tobin’s
Q, and market-to-book ratio” in the English language were entered into some of the mainstream
scientific databases (e.g., Emerald, EBSCO; ProQuest, Wiley Online, Google Scholar, Sciencedirect,
Scopus, and SSRN). Unpublished studies, including dissertations on several academic message
boards, were requested. Finally, specific journals that usually publish empirical papers on the studied
topic (e.g., Corporate Governance: An International Review, International Journal of Economics and
Financial Issues, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of
Financial Economics) were carefully examined. The above-mentioned searches were concluded in
September 2017.
4.2. Inclusion Criteria
The first and main inclusion criterion is that the papers needed to be of empirical nature. They must
report correlation coefficients between firms’ boardroom independence and CFP or the required data
to obtain them using alternative conversion methods (see for example, Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, &
Rothstein, [17]; Peterson & Brown, [81]). For example, when the manuscripts did not report correlation
coefficients but showed regression coefficients (β) we transformed them into correlations following
Peterson & Brown [81]. That is to say, the computed correlations (r) were obtained by r = β (standardized)
+ 0.05 λ, where λ is a variable that equals 1 when β is positive and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, bivariate
correlation coefficients were used as effect sizes (see García-Meca, & Sánchez-Ballesta, [82]; Orlitzky,
Schmidt, & Rynes, [83]; Wagner, Block, Miller, Schwens, & Xi, [84]). This choice has been widespread
in recent meta-analyses linking some corporate governance mechanisms on CFP [53,85]. It is worth
mentioning that studies’ corresponding authors were contacted when the reported numerical data was
insufficient to compute the effect size. No stipulations were imposed on the nationality of the sample
or year of publication. Articles were required to show a CFP outcome, such as return on assets, return
on equity, return on sales, market return, Tobin’s Q or market-to-book ratio. Another criterion is that
the effect size must to be linked to a unique sample. Following Wood [86], samples reported in more
than one articles were excluded, due to their likelihood of being a repeat sample. Finally, the papers
must report the data required to test for the moderating effects (or it must be possible to calculate it
indirectly). After this process, 126 studies meet the required inclusion criteria (see Table 1). Complete
details of the articles in the sample are shown in Table A1 in Appendix A.
This table shows an overview of the primary studies included in the sample. It also shows the
percentages of positive effects for each category of primary studies. Data related to the protection of
minority investors mechanisms variable has been omitted because it is a continuous variable.
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Table 1. Summary statistics of meta-analysis sample.
Number of Effects Percentage of Positive Effect Sizes
All Primary Studies 126 54.76%
CFP Measure
Accounting-Based 84 58.33%
Market-Based 42 47.62%
Market Conditions
2010–2017 30 63.33%
2007–2009 25 40.00%
2002–2006 45 64.44%
Before 2002 26 38.46%
Countries’ Legal Systems
Civil Law 49 57.14%
Common Law 77 53.25%
4.3. Meta-Analytic Procedure
To test the working hypotheses, a meta-analytical regression analysis (MARA) was implemented
(see [16–18]). This approach overcomes some limitations of conventional meta-analytical models
(e.g., HOMA) which often use subsets to test the moderators. This is because the MARA approach
makes it possible to include and jointly analyze two or more discrete or continuous moderators as
predictors in the regression model [17]. The dependent variable comprises the different studies’ effect
sizes, which in this case represents an estimate of the degree of association between firms’ boardroom
independence and CFP. We perform a weighted regression and regressed the dependent variable on
three hypothesized variables (i.e., CFP, countries’ legal systems and mechanisms for the protection
of minority investors). Interestingly, and for robustness purposes, the model controls for different
methodological artefacts that have been traditionally useful to explain wide variations in companies’
boards independence. Those are: (i) Market conditions; (ii) CFP measurement approach; and (iii)
journal quality standards.
A random effects (RE) approach was estimated because inferences can be extrapolated outside the
sample studies when their characteristics are non-homogeneous. Under this approach, each effect size
is weighted by the inverse of its variance, which encompasses the original within-studies variance plus
the estimate of the between-studies variance (see for example [17,87]).
Heterogeneity levels were assessed by computing the I2 statistic provided by Higgins and
Thomson [88]. Interpretation of this measure is straightforward, since low values indicate that
variability is due to sampling error and high values suggest the inclusion of more moderators in the
model to explain the relationship. For each estimated model, we report the percentage of variance
not explained by the sampling error (Q-model), and R2, reflecting the total variance explained by the
moderators [17].
The publication bias was tested through the Rosenthal null tolerance index [89]. The estimated
value was 294, which indicates the absence of publication bias. For robustness purposes, a Funnel Plot
(Figure 1) was provided to further test for the existence of publication bias.
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The Funnel plot is symmetrical, indicating that the distribution of the 126 studies analyzed
is homogeneous and the existence of publication bias is rejected. Finally, we computed the Egger,
Davey-Smith, & Minder. [90] t-statistic which has a value of 0.6721 (p-value = 0.2512), which implies
that there is no publication bias.
4.4. Variables’ Measures
4.4.1. Countries’ Legal Systems
To test for this conceptual moderator, we divided the sample according to the legal system in which
the companies of each paper are located. Following Siddiqui [91] and Ortas, Álvarez, & Zubeltzu. [24]
we have grouped corporate governance systems into two categories: (i) Common law systems, and
(ii) civil or codified law systems. The civil or codified law system was taken as the baseline case.
4.4.2. Minority Investors’ Protection Mechanisms
The conceptual moderator extent of investor protection was measured through the value assigned
to each country by the minority investors’ protection index developed by the World Bank [92]. This
index has recently been used in two meta-analyses that focus on board gender composition and
CFP [53,85]. In essence, this index reflects the effort of the different countries to defend the interests
of stakeholders and minority shareholders over the interests of the majority shareholders and the
managers of the companies.
4.4.3. Incidence of Market Conditions (Methodological Moderator)
Previous research has found contradictory evidence of how market conditions influence the
financial efficiency of independent directors. While some research [10,93,94] indicates that increasing
the level of board independence during bear markets decreases CFP, other studies [95–97] suggest
that companies with more independent boards achieve greater levels of CFP during downturns.
In fact, during the past two decades, a huge number of recommendations [98], principles [99,100],
and governance codes [101–103] were proposed to increase the efficiency of corporations’ boards. In
general, the proposed guidelines have led to an evolution in corporate boards [104] which often are
(i) smaller [105,106]; (ii) more independent [9,106], and (iii) more diverse [64,107]. The most significant
changes in board composition have occurred in specific market conditions. Business knowledge and
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resource requirements are not the same in bear and bull markets [14]. For example, Zahra [108] argues
that companies are more likely to appoint internal directors to their boards in bear markets, usually
accompanied by high levels of uncertainty, because they are better informed about the characteristics
of the industry in which they are operating and can identify the sources of risk.
This paper addresses the differences in levels of independence of board across time to control
for different strategies that boards may adopt (i.e., value maintenance vs. value creation). Four
time-periods have been selected. The first runs until 2002, and its end coincides with the proliferation
of different governance codes mainly motivated by the economic scandals of the beginning of the
century (e.g., Parmalat, Tyco, Worldcom, and Enron) and the outcomes of the Dotcom bubble. The
second period runs from 2003 to 2006, when most developed and emerging economies experienced
growth. Cuomo, Mallin, & Zattoni. [102] state that during this period (i.e., following the Dotcom
bubble) most of the recommendations and regulatory advice on how to shape an efficient board of
directors were in line with the postulates of agency theory. Companies appointed more independent
directors to strengthen the board’s control and to increase efficiency. Two significant examples of this
line of thought are the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the UK Combined Code of 2003. In response
to the new requirements, the balance between internal and external directors in company boards shifted
to favor diversity and independence [109]. The third period runs from 2007 to 2009, which encompass
the recent financial crisis. During this period, further recommendations and regulations were launched
with the aim of increasing the corporate boards’ efficiency. Those measures have been criticized for their
inability to mitigate the negative outcomes of the crisis [110]. In fact, the European Commission [111]
argued that the lack of independent directors on boards was one of the primary deficiencies of
corporate governance models. The last period runs from 2010 to 2017, and is characterized by the
modification of a large number of governance codes (e.g., The UK Corporate Governance Code-2014 &
2016; Principles of Corporate Governance United States 2012 & 2016; German Corporate Governance
Code- 2010-2012-2013-2014 & 2015; Japan’s Corporate Governance Code-2015) with the aim of altering
corporate boards in the following ways [30]: (i) Reducing the number of independent directors, and
(ii) strengthening the skills and knowledge of board members [52,98,105,112].
To control for market conditions, a nominal variable was created which ranges from one to four.
The time-periods comprised for each category are: (1) Before 2002; (2) from 2003 to 2006; (3) from
2007 to 2009; and (4) from 2010 to 2017. Each paper in the sample was coded according to the period
examined in the empirical analysis. The last category (i.e., from 2010 to 2017) was selected as the
baseline case. Thus, a positive and significant coefficient for each category reveals that the strength of
the effect of board independence on CFP was stronger for that time-period than for the baseline.
4.4.4. Corporate Financial Performance Measurement: Accounting-Based vs. Market-Based
Approaches (Methodological Moderator)
Research suggests that board independence can have different effects on CFP as a result of the
use of different measurement approaches [7,9,56]. Zahra and Pearce [113] describe two main CFP
measurement models: (i) Accounting-based measures and (ii) market-based measures. Although
both measures have their advantages and limitations, accounting-based measures of CFP have been
criticized because: (i) They can be manipulated by company managers [114,115]; (ii) they systematically
undervalue firms’ assets [116,117]; and (iii) they cannot be easily understood for firms in different
industries and markets [13,118]. However, Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes. [83] argue that accounting-based
measures of CFP better address organizational capacity and efficiency. CFP market-based measures
comprise market-participant expectations about the ability of the companies to generate value in the
long-term [23]. These approaches are better at capturing companies’ risk adjusted CFP [115] and reflect
the shareholders’ requirements more closely [83].
Previous research on the link between board independence and CFP employs a wide range of
CFP measurement approaches, including: (i) Return on assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), and
return on equity (ROE) for the accounting [119,120]; and (ii) annual market return, Tobin’s Q, and
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market-to-book ratio for the market perspective [40,65,121]. Measurement methods have been studied
as potential moderators in studies and meta-analyses examining the linkages between CFP and
some corporate governance variables, such as board characteristics [14,15,53,56,91]) and ownership
structures [58,84,122].
This paper controls for this methodological artefact and responds to a call in the literature [13,14,55]
for further research and empirical evidence of such a possible effect. A wide range of CFP measures were
identified in the papers analysed, including ROA, ROE, ROS, sales growth, revenue, performance factor,
financial and market performance, stock return, Tobin’s Q, and market-to-book ratio. The measures can
be grouped into two categories: (i) Accounting-based measures; and (ii) market-based measures. This
classification was used to categorize the dependent variables because it is widely reported that each
category addresses different kinds of organizational performance [123,124]. While accounting-based
measures reflect the past capacity of the company to generate profits, market-based measures also
incorporate external expectations and perspectives on a firm’s future value. Accounting-based measures
of CFP were considered to be the baseline (i.e., intercept in Model 2). Thus, a positive and significant
coefficient estimated for the second category (i.e., market-based measures) indicates that the strength of
the effect of board independence on CFP was stronger when CFP was measured through market-based
measures. For robustness purposes, we estimated the different models (Model 3 and 4) for each of
the categories of the CFP measurement approach (i.e., accounting and market-based). This approach
makes it possible to isolate the effect of some moderators and leads to a better understanding of the
effect of board independence on CFP.
4.4.5. Journal Quality Standards (Methodological Moderator)
The method also controls for journal quality standards because papers published in well rated
journals are assumed to have a greater impact than those ones published in journals with lesser
impact. Based on this assessment, a journal’s impact is a reflection of the analytical and methodological
rigor, as well as theoretical contributions of the papers. Accordingly, higher quality papers may
reveal a different effect from research developed. The model implemented (i.e., MARA) allows using
continuous variables. Due to this, journals’ quality was measured through three different approaches,
this being: (i) the journals’ Hirsch factor (h-factor) retrieved from the Web of Science; (ii) the journals’
h-factor obtained from the Scimago Journal Rank; and, (iii) by a binary variable that takes the value of
1 if the primary paper is published in a journal with a h-factor greater than the median of the h-factor
of all included papers and 0 otherwise.
5. Results
The results obtained are reported in Table 2. This section describes the main results provided by
the different models estimated. A two-step procedure was followed to ask the research hypotheses
and provide relevant information to evaluate the incidence of the conceptual moderators. In a first
step, Model 1 was estimated on the full sample of articles to test the overall effect of firms’ boardroom
independence on CFP. Model 2 was also estimated with the aim of showing the role played by the
approach followed to measure CFP on the studied relationship. In a second step, the model with
all moderator variables is estimated for two sub-samples of papers: (i) First for the articles that
measure CFP through accounting-based approaches (Model 3); and (ii) second for those measuring
CFP through market-based approaches (Model 4). Models 3 and 4, which comprise some conceptual
and methodological moderators, describe the data fairly well. However, the significant Q-residual
reveals the relevance of other moderators with influence on CFP that has not been included in the
model [18].
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Table 2. Results of meta-analytic regression analysis.
Model 1 (Full
Sample)
Model 2 (Full
Sample)
Model 3
(Sub-Sample 1)
Model 4
(Sub-Sample 2)
Overall Size Effect
Intercept 0.0071 (0.0093) 0.0220 ** (0.0112) 0.0498 *** (0.0265) −0.2234 ** (0.1109)
Moderators
CFP Measure (Market-Based) −0.0435 **(0.0191)
2007–2009 −0.0415 * (0.0332) −0.0213 (0.0422)
2002–2006 −0.0104 (0.0282) 0.0604 * (0.0398)
Before 2002 −0.0902 *** (0.0375) 0.0255 (0.0431)
Common Law Countries −0.0065 (0.0282) −0.0631 ** (0.0308)
Protection of Minority
Investors −0.0020 (0.0125) 0.0362 ** (0.0183)
Journal Quality 0.0001 (0.0001) −0.0002 (0.0001)
Model Additional Data
K 126 126 84 42
I2 93.46% 93.44% 90.08% 81.39%
R2 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.40
Qmodel (p) 0.00 [1.00] 5.21 [0.02] 7.06 [0.21] 16.76 [0.01]
Qresidual (p) 1912.55 [0.00] 1889.28 [0.00] 756.33 [0.00] 188.05 [0.00]
This table shows the estimates of the meta-analytical regression analysis. Model 1and 2 focus on the full sample of
articles (126). Model 3 focuses on those papers that measure CFP through accounting-based measures (84). Model
4 focuses on those papers that measure CFP through market-based measures (42). Unstandardized regression
coefficients are reported. Standard errors are in parentheses and p-values are in brackets. K refers to the total
number of effect sizes; Q refers to the homogeneity statistic. * Significant at the 10% level, ** significant at the 5%
level, and *** significant at the 1% level.
Model 1, which encompasses all the sample of articles, shows a non-significant overall size effect
(Intercept = rˆ = 0.0071; SE = 0.0093; p > 0.1). This result suggests a neutral relationship between
firms’ boardroom independence and CFP. Because of these results, H1 cannot be accepted. It is worth
mentioning that this non-significant effect is robust to different methodological specifications. For
robustness purposes, this size effect has been computed following the traditional meta-analytical
approach provided by Hedges and Olkin [125]. It provided an average correlation coefficient of 0.0075
with a confidence interval at 95% ranging from −0.0008 to 0.0229. These results also do not support the
first working hypothesis. However, this non-significant effect of firms’ boardroom independence on
CFP may be due to the appearance of compensation effects. In fact, accounting-based and market-based
measures of CFP represent two different realities of organizational performance [23], with little
empirical overlap. Accordingly, Model 2 includes a methodological moderator linked to the different
CFP measurement approaches. Results of Model 2 show an overall positive and significant effect size
(Intercept = rˆ = 0.0220 ∗∗; SE = 0.0112; p > 0.01) when CFP is approached by accounting-based
measures and a negative and significant effect size (β = −0.0435 ∗∗; SE = 0.0191; p > 0.01; rˆ = −0.0215).
These results support the existence of an effect of board independence on CFP. While there is a
positive and significant effect of board independence on CFP when the latter is measured through
accounting-based models, the effect becomes negative and significant when CFP is approached through
market-based measures. This result makes it possible to answer the first working hypothesis in a more
refined way. That is to say, while H1 is supported when CFP is measured through accounting-based
approaches, the same hypothesis cannot be accepted if CFP is approached by market-based measures.
According with these results, it seems more appropriate (see [17,18]) to test the last two hypotheses
by splitting the sample into two kind of studies: (i) Papers that measure CFP through accounting-based
proxies (Model 3); and (ii) by market-based approaches (Model 4). This will avoid overlapping
both CFP measurement methods [23], thus providing a better understanding on the effect of firms’
boardroom independence on CFP.
H2 argued for a moderating effect of countries’ legal systems in the relationship between board
independence and CFP. It predicted that the link will be weaker for companies in common law
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countries. While the estimates are non-significant for Model 3 (i.e., which only considered the studies
that measured CFP through accounting-based approaches), the regression coefficient is negative and
significant (β = −0.0631 ∗∗; SE = 0.0308; p < 0.01) when focusing on Model 4 (i.e., which comprises
the manuscript which focused on market-based measures to approach CSP). These results reveal that
the effect of board independence on CFP is weaker for companies in common law countries only
when organizational performance is measured through market-based measures. Accordingly, H2 only
cannot be rejected when CFP is measured through market-based approaches.
H3 predicted that the relationship between firms’ boardroom independence and CFP is stronger
for companies in countries with stronger protection mechanisms for minority shareholders. The
regression coefficient is non-significant for Model 3, but the estimate is positive and significant
(β = 0.0362 ∗∗; SE = 0.0183; p > 0.01) for Model 4 (i.e., sub-sample of articles using a market-based
measure of CFP). This finding addresses that the existence of strong mechanisms aimed at protecting the
minority investors’ rights stimulate independent directors’ efficiency, thus increasing firms’ financial
wealth. According with these findings, H3 can only be rejected when CFP is measured through
market-based approaches.
Robustness checks were conducted to assess the results’ reliability. The obtained estimates
warrant comment. First, the results reveal a moderating effect of market conditions on the firms’
boardroom independence–CFP relationship. In fact, the estimates confirm (see Model 3) that the
positive influence of companies’ board independence on accounting measures of CFP is weaker under
bear market conditions. Furthermore, the estimates of Model 4 find that the negative influence of
corporate boards’ independence on market-based CFP measures is weaker in bullish markets. The
results of the last methodological control variable indicate that journal quality does not moderate the
relationship between firms’ boardroom independence and CFP. Furthermore, this result is robust to
different models’ specifications (i.e., β = 0.0001; SE = 0.0001; p > 0.1 in Model 3 and β = −0.0002; SE =
0.0002; p > 0.1 in Model 4).
6. Discussion
Drawing on the framework of Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson [13] and Rhoades, Rechner,
& Sundaramurthy [14], this paper addresses that board independence does not act as a catalyst for
CFP, thus confirming previous research findings [13–15]. However, we extend previous evidence
by showing that this non-significant relationship is a consequence of a compensation effect between
the positive/negative link between board independence and CFP, measured through accounting and
market-based approaches.
Our results are similar to those obtained by Post and Byron [53], who examined the effect of the
gender composition of boards on CFP and found that the presence of women on boards increases
the likelihood that companies will maximize the benefits of their investments (i.e., enhance their
CFP measured through accounting-based measures). One of the possible reasons for the negative
influence of firms’ board independence on market-based measures of CFP is that the latter concept
incorporates external expectations and perspectives on the company’s future value rather than the
ability of the company to generate profits from their current assets [23,117]. Our results indicate that
market expectations are negative for firms having more directors that are independent. In general,
our findings support the idea that independent directors have greater control and influence over
accounting performance than market performance [126].
The results also indicate some factors that explain some of the variation in the strength of
relationship between board independence and CFP. We find that the negative influence of board
independence on market CFP is greater in common law countries than in civil law countries. La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny [127–129] argue that companies with a common law tradition are
more likely to protect dispersed shareholders’ interests from management decisions. Common law
countries are often classified as having a shareholder orientation, thus prioritizing short-term results.
In response, markets penalize companies with greater board independence levels. This finding is in line
Sustainability 2019, 11, 7121 13 of 25
with our hypothesis, which predicts that markets will lack confidence in independent directors [126],
especially in companies from common law countries.
Further results indicate that the negative effect of board independence on market-based measures
of CFP is of less magnitude in companies in countries where there is strong protection of minority
investors. This is because, in that situation, independent directors are motivated to be more forceful in
their role of protecting shareholders’ interests [21]. This finding is in line with previous research [32,77]
that finds a “bundle of governance mechanisms” that have an impact [19,130]. This research suggests
that the bundle of different mechanisms of corporate governance—both internal (e.g., board structure)
and external (e.g., protection of shareholders)—are combined and interact, complementing and even
replacing each other in their enhancement of CFP.
The study also addresses that market conditions (i.e., bear and bull markets) play a role in
the firms’ board independence–CFP connection. Moreover, this moderating effect is different when
CFP is measured through accounting- and market-based variables. The positive influence of board
independence on accounting-based CFP is less in bear markets. This is because independent directors are
more likely to control for financial efficiency in bear markets, focusing on value maintenance (e.g., costs
and margins). Independent directors’ decisions are likely to be more conservative and have influence
on CFP. This finding is in accordance with some proposals of the agency and resources dependence
theories [30], which argue that internal and non-independent directors have greater knowledge of a
firm’s internal functioning and are more efficient in times of market downturns [94,131].
Our results also reveal that the negative influence of board independence on CFP measured
through market-based variables is less negative in bull markets. This can be explained by the fact that
independent directors prioritize the creation of corporate value [29,39], thus increasing the influence of
their decisions on CFP [52]. Moreover, human and relational capital are key factors when selecting
independent directors during bull markets [52], so that they can more effectively provide advice and
counsel [49]. This provides the organization with the ability to legitimate its activities and access
specific resources [50,51], thereby increasing CFP.
7. Conclusions, Limitations, and Future Research Agenda
This study addresses, from a meta-regression approach, the extent to which firms’ boardroom
independence influences corporate financial performance (CFP). Our central results indicate that
firms with more independent boards achieve higher and lower CFP when CFP is measured through
accounting-based and market-based approaches, respectively. The findings also identify some
moderating variables in the above-mentioned connection. Specifically, the positive effect of board
independence on accounting-based measures of CFP is less during market downturns. The negative
influence of boardroom independence on market-based CFP measures is less in bull markets. These
findings are of great importance for company managers and their shareholders in different ways.
First, senior management can arrange their boardroom structure as a function of their short and
long-term financial objectives and the market conditions with the aim of increasing organizational
performance structure of the firm’s board and the market conditions. Our results also suggest the
value of assessing independent directors’ efficiency from the perspective of the “bundle of governance
mechanisms” [130,132]. We show that independent directors’ financial efficiency is greater for
companies in countries with established policies for the protection of minority shareholders. This
finding may have interesting implications for policy-makers, agencies managing corporate governance
codes, company managers, and investors. In fact, evidence about the demand from institutional
investors for mechanisms to protect the rights of minority investors may be extended to other
social actors.
This paper has a number of limitations. Among them, the most significant is related to the fact
that the blanket measure of independence of a firm’s board is not able to capture the ability of different
kinds of external and independent directors to manage both financial and non-financial resources.
Further research on the topic should be directed to examining the influence of the different types of
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independent directors on CFP. Furthermore, there is need to jointly test the influence of boardroom
independence on CFP with other internal and external corporate governance mechanisms (such as
gender composition, board size, company’s board leadership structure, ownership concentration, and
institutional ownership, among others) to help companies to manage their board structures and adapt
them to different market conditions.
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Appendix A
Table A1. Primary studies in meta-analysis.
Author Year Journal Sample Size ObservedSize Effects Author Year Journal Sample Size
Observed Size
Effects
Acero & Alcalde 2012 Spanish Accounting Review 171 0.106 Jackling & Johl 2009
Corporate
Governance: An
International Review
180 0.06
Adams & Jiang 2016 Journal of Banking & Finance 1168 0.2 to 0.31 Jackowicz &Kowalewski 2012
Emerging Markets
Review 156 0.07
Adams & Ferreira 2009 Journal of FinancialEconomics 8253
−0.041 to
−0.011
Javaid-Lone, Ali
& Khan 2016
Corporate
Governance: The
international Journal
of Business in Society
250 0.12
Akpan & Amran 2014 Journal of Finance andAccounting 270 −0.061 Jizi 2017
Business Strategy and
the Environment 1155 −0.03
Aman & Nguyen 2008 Journal of the Japanese andInternational Economies 1550 0.026 to 0.136
Jizi, Salama,
Dixon & Stratling 2014
Journal of Business
Ethics 291 0.13
Arayssi, Dah &
Jizi 2016
Sustainability Accounting,
Management and Policy
Journal
975 −0.033 to0.039
Johnson &
Greening 1999
Academy of
Management Journal 252 −0.12 to −0.03
Arena, Bozzolna
& Michelon 2015
Corporate Social
Responsibility and
Environmental Management
288 −0.112 to0.168
Kaczmarek,
Kimino & Py 2012
Corporate
Governance: An
International Review
3106 0.04
Barakat, Pérez &
Ariza 2015
Review of Managerial
Science 101 0.04
Kang, Ding &
Charoenwong 2010
Journal of Business
Research 45 0.31
Barroso Castro,
La Concha,
Dominguez,
Gravel & Periñan
2009 Corporate Governance: AnInternational Review 862 −0.02 Rao, Tilt & Lester 2012
Corporate
Governance: The
international journal
of business in society
96 0.06
Beiner, Drobetz,
Schmid &
Zimmermann
2006 European FinancialManagement 109 −0.1247 Kent & Monem 2008
Australian
Accounting Review 72 −0.01
Ben-Amar, Chang
& McIlkenny 2015 Journal of Business Ethics 541 −0.05 to −0.03 Kiel & Nicholson 2003
Corporate
Governance: An
International Review
348 −0.179 to 0.023
Berrone &
Gomez-Mejia 2009
Academy of Management
Journal 2088 −0.07 to −0.01 Kilic 2015
International Journal
of Business and
Management
130 −0.089 to 0.017
Bhagat & Bolton 2013 Journal of Financial andQuantitative Analysis 6683 −0.05 to −0.04 Kiliç & Kuzey 2016
Gender in
Management: An
International Journal
745 −0.018 to 0.058
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Table A1. Cont.
Author Year Journal Sample Size ObservedSize Effects Author Year Journal Sample Size
Observed Size
Effects
Bonn 2004
Journal of the Australian and
New Zealand Academy of
Management
84 −0.87 to 0.285 Kim 2013 InternationalManagement Review 290 −0.11
Bonn, Yoshikawa
& Phan 2004
Asian Business &
Management 169
−0.052 to
0.254
Kock, Santaló &
Diestre 2012
Journal of
Management Studies 657 0.01
Bonn, Yoshikawa
& Phan 2004
Asian Business &
Management 104
−0.011 to
−0.028 Kouki & Guizani 2015
International
Business Research 294 0.3
Boulouta 2013 Journal of Business Ethics 820 0.0236 Kyereboah-Coleman& Biekpe 2006
Corporate Ownership
and Control 176 −0.008
Brammer,
Millington &
Pavelin 2009
British Journal of
Management 199 −0.095 Lefort & Urzúa 2008
Journal of Business
Research 562 0.06
Cai, Keasey, &
Short 2006
European Financial
Management 566 −0.05 Li, Zhang & Foo 2013
Chinese Management
Studies 613 0.01
Chapple, Kent &
Routledge 2012
Working paper (Social
Science Research Network) 1182 −0.01 Liao, Luo & Tang 2015
The British
Accounting Review 329 −0.16
Charles, Redor &
Zopounidis 2015 Economics Bulletin 1181 −0.094
Lim, Matolcsy &
Chow 2007
European Accounting
Review 181 0.116
Chen, Crossland,
& Huang 2016
Strategic Management
Journal 13,248 −0.07 to 0.04 Liu, Wei y Xie 2014
Journal of Corporate
Finance 16964 0.128
Cheung, Connelly,
Impaphayom &
Zhou
2007
Journal of International
Financial Management &
Accounting
168 0.027 to 0.043 Mallin &Michelon 2011
Accounting and
Business Research 278 0.081
Cheung, Jiang,
Limpaphayom &
Lu
2010 European FinancialManagement 287
−0.011 to
0.024
McGuinness,
Vieito & Wang 2017
Journal of Corporate
Finance 2412 0.02
Choi, Lee & Park 2013 Corporate Governance: AnInternational Review 2042 −0.07 to 0.03
Mohammadi,
Basir & Löö 2015
CESIS Electronic
Working Paper Series 55769 −0.09
Combs, Ketchen,
Perryman &
Donahue
2007 Journal of ManagementStudies 73 0.00
Mori, Golesorkhi,
Randøy &
Hermes
2015 Strategic Change 228 −0.025
Cormier, Ledoux
& Magnan 2011 Management Decision 137 −0.1
Musteen, Datta &
Kemmerer 2010
British Journal of
Management 324 −0.00
Cumming, Leung
& Rui 2015
Academy of Management
Journal 1448 0.07
Nekhili &
Gatfaoui 2013
Journal of Business
Ethics 450 −0.106 to −0.213
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Observed Size
Effects
Daghsni,
Zouhayer &
Mbarek
2016 Arabian Journal of Businessand Management Review 350 0.068
Nguyen, Locke &
Reddley 2015
International Review
of Economics and
Finance
479 −0.03
Dang & Nguyen 2016 Management International 284 −0.144 to−0.136
Nurhayati, Taylor
& Tower 2015
Proceedings of the
Australasian
Conference on
Business and Social
Sciences
285 0.032
Darmadi 2013
Corporate Governance: The
International Journal of
Business in Society
354 −0.1 to 0.01 Oh, Chang &Cheng 2016
Journal of Business
Ethics 1332 −0.01
Darmadi &
Gunawan 2013 Managerial Finance 101 0.046 O’Reilly & Main 2012
Working paper
(Social Science
Research Network)
1796 0.04
David, Bloom &
Hillman 2007
Strategic Management
Journal 730 −0.2 to −0.16 Ouyang 2007
Published PhD
dissertation 23,209 −0.039 to 0.122
De Villiers 2011 Journal of Management 5997 −0.01 to 0.00 Ozcan & Ince 2016 InternationalBusiness Research 112 −0.16 to −0.18
Desender,
Aguilera, Crespi
& García-cestona
2013 Strategic ManagementJournal 242 −0.13 Pahuja & Bhatia 2010
The IUP Journal of
Corporate
Governance
50 −0.036 to 0.031
Dixon-Fowler,
Ellstrand &
Johnson
2017 Journal of Business Ethics 76 0.12 Pathan & Faff 2013 Journal of Banking &Finance 2640 −0.21 to −0.16
Dobbin & Jung 2011 North Carolina Law Review 3016 0.025 Pathan, Skully yWickramanayake 2007
Asia Pacific Financial
Markets 64 0.075 to 0.1579
Ducassy 2015 Research in InternationalBusiness and Finance 41 0.19 Peng, Li, Xie & Su 2010
Asia Pacific Journal of
Management 300 −0.017
Dunn & Sainty 2009 International Journal ofManagerial Finance 174 0.025 Peng, Zhang & Li 2007
Management and
Organization Review 1202 0.05
Fernández,
Gómez-Ansón &
Fernández-Méndez
1998 Investigaciones Económicas 67 0.203
Prado-Lorenzo,
Sánchez, &
Gallego-Álvarez
2009
Revista Española de
Financiación y
Contabilidad
288 0.04
Fernández-Gago,
Cabeza-García &
Nieto
2016 Review of ManagerialScience 145 0.014
Rodriguez-Fernadez,
Fernández-Alonso
&
Rodríguez-Rodríguez
2013
Revista Europea de
Dirección
y Economía de la
Empresa
121 0.02 to 0.112
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Author Year Journal Sample Size ObservedSize Effects Author Year Journal Sample Size
Observed Size
Effects
Fidanoski,
Mateska &
Simeonovski
2014 Advances in FinancialEconomics 175 −0.1 to 0.12
Rubino, Tenuta &
Cambrea 2016
Journal of
Management &
Governance
1613 −0.0176
Galbreath 2011 Journal of Management andOrganization 161 0.04 to 0.22
Rutledge, Karim
& Lu 2016
Journal of Applied
Business and
Economics
470 0.038
Galbreath 2016 Business Strategy and theEnvironment 300 0.02
Sahin, Basfirinci &
Ozsalih 2011
Published PhD
dissertation 96 −0.136 to 0.171
Gallego-Álvarez,
García-Sánchez, &
Rodríguez-Dominguez
2010 Spanish Accounting Review 288 0.062 Saibaba 2013
IUP Journal of
Corporate
Governance
195 −0.217
García Lara,
García Osma &
Penalva
2007 European AccountingReview 193 0.08 Setia-Atmaja 2009
Corporate
Governance: An
International Review
0.21 0.04 to 0.21
Garcia-Sanchez,
Cuadrado-Ballesteros
& Sepulveda
2014 Management Decision 686 0.015 Shaukat, Qiu &Trojanowski 2016
Journal of Business
Ethics 2028 0.02
Giannarakis 2014 Social Responsibility Journal 100 −0.033 to0.108
Stefanelli &
Cotugno 2012
Academy of Banking
Studies Journal 76 −0.104
Gregory-Smith,
Main & O’Reilly 2014 The Economic Journal 13,870 −0.024 Tang 2016
European
Management Journal 364 −0.01 to 0.03
Gul, Srinidhi &
Tsui 2008
Working paper (Social
Science Research Network) 2784
−0.0166 to
−0.0031
Tauringana &
Chithambo 2015
The British
Accounting Review 860 0.07
Gulzar & Wang 2011
International Journal of
Accounting and Financial
Reporting
1011 −0.02 Triana, Miller &Trzebiatowski 2013 Organization Science 462 −0.02
Gupta, Lam, Sami
& Zhou 2015
Working paper (Social
Science Research Network) 1153 0.02 Uadiale 2010
International Journal
of Business and
Management
30 0.075 to 0.75
Hafsi & Turgut 2013 Journal of Business Ethics 95 −0.01 Alix Valenti, Luce& Mayfield 2011
Management
Research Review 87 −0.28
Hahn & Lasfer 2007 Cass Business SchoolResearch Paper 764 0.012 to 0.022
Villanueva-Villar,
Rivo-López &
Lago-Peñas
2016 Business ResearchQuarterly 438 0.083
Haque 2017 The British AccountingReview 363 −0.04 to −0.01 Vo & Nguyen 2014
International Journal
of Economics and
Finance
752 −0.06 to 0
Hogan, Olson &
Sharma 2014
Journal of Leadership,
Accountability and Ethics 540 0.11 Walls & Berrone 2015
Journal of Business
Ethics 1320 0.08
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Author Year Journal Sample Size ObservedSize Effects Author Year Journal Sample Size
Observed Size
Effects
Hoje & Harjoto 2011 Journal of Business Ethics 13,389 −0.04 to 0.01 Walls & Hoffman 2013
Journal of
Organizational
Behavior
1881 −0.18
Honeine & Swan 2011 Working paper (SocialScience Research Network) 1374 −0.14 to 0.04
Walls, Berrone &
Phan 2012
Strategic
Management Journal 2002 −0.01
Horner & Valenti 2012 Journal of Leadership,Accountability and Ethics 238 −0.01
Wang, Wang,
Zhang & Yang 2012
African Journal of
Business
Management
446 0.007
Horvath &
Spirollari 2012 Prague economic papers 680 0.028
Zemzem &
Kacemb 2014
International Journal
of Finance & Banking
Studies
170 0.18
Hu, Tam & Tan 2010 Asia Pacific Journal ofManagement 304 0.03 to 0.07 Zhang 2012
Corporate
Governance: The
international journal
of business in society
475 −0.03 to −0.02
Huang 2010 Journal of Management andOrganization 297 0.174
Zhang, Zhu &
Ding 2013
Journal of Business
Ethics 516 −0.01
Hussain, Rigoni &
Orij 2016 Journal of Business Ethics 152 0.037
Zorn, Shropshire,
Martin, Combs &
Ketchen
2017 StrategicManagement Journal 3124 0.03 to 0.04
This table shows the main details of the papers included in the final sample of the meta-analysis.
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